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HIS Article examines the most significant developments in the law of
arrest, search, and confessions during the Survey period. It reviews
federal and state cases implicating the critical procedural and sub-
stantive applications of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments to the United
States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of Texas constitutional
and statutory law. This Article also discusses several crucial opinions of the
United States Supreme Court, along with the most noteworthy opinions of
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the various courts of appeals.
I. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Courts have long recognized that a lawful custodial arrest authorizes a
contemporaneous, warrantless search of the person arrested and of the im-
mediately surrounding area.' The scope of the area searched is limited,
however, to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.2 Several
years ago in New York v. Belton 3 the United States Supreme Court extended
this principle to searches of the interior of an automobile, ruling that police
may search the passenger compartment of an automobile as incident to a
lawful arrest of the occupant of that automobile. 4 During the Survey period,
however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made clear that the Belton
rationale will not apply absent a firm evidentiary showing by the prosecution
that the arrestee was, indeed, a recent occupant of the vehicle. In Gauldin v.
State5 the appellant robbed a convenience store and drove away in a red
pick-up truck. Police soon spotted the truck in a parking lot of a nearby bar.
The police found the appellant inside the bar and took him to the parking lot
where he acknowledged that he had been driving the truck. The officers
placed the appellant under arrest and subsequently searched the vehicle.
The search resulted in the discovery of some of the stolen money in the glove
compartment. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals erroneously held that the
* B.A., Washington and Lee University; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law.
Attorney at Law, Bruner, McColl, McColloch & McCurley, Dallas, Texas.
1. The Supreme Court firmly established the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
2. Id.
3. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
4. Id. at 460.
5. 683 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
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Belton rationale justified the search as incident to the appellant's arrest.6
But the court of criminal appeals made clear that, at least in Texas, the
Belton exception to the warrant requirement will be strictly construed, and
held the search of the vehicle impermissible. 7 Through Judge McCormick
the en banc court held that the record did not demonstrate that the appellant
was either an occupant of the truck or a recent occupant within the Belton
context.8 Furthermore, the record failed to reflect the appellant's proximity
to the vehicle at the time of his arrest; thus, the State had failed to prove the
items inside the automobile were within the area where the arrestee could
grab a weapon or evidentiary item.9 Because no proof existed of any exigent
circumstances which would justify the warrantless search under the tradi-
tional automobile search exception,10 the mere existence of probable cause
was insufficient to render the fruits of the search admissible."I Finally, the
court of criminal appeals struck down the court of appeals' holding that
justified the search of the vehicle as a constitutionally permissible inventory
search.' 2 Although the record revealed facts sufficient to justify an inven-
tory search of the truck,' 3 the record was devoid of any evidence that the
police actually engaged in this caretaking function. 14 The officers only testi-
fied that they had searched the vehicle, but not that they had actually con-
ducted an inventory search.' 5  The absence of any testimony regarding
actual adherence to standard police inventory procedure compelled the court
of criminal appeals to the conclusion that the State had not sustained its
burden of proof to show a lawful inventory search.' 6
6. Gauldin v. State, 632 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982), affd on other
grounds, 683 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
7. 683 S.W.2d at 414.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
10. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals had also erroneously upheld the search under
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970), in which the Supreme Court upheld war-
rantless searches of automobiles under the normal exigencies involved in a stop of a vehicle on
the open highway. Gaudlin v. State, 632 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982),
af/'d on other grounds, 683 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The court of appeals
misapplied Chambers in failing to address the presence of exigent circumstances, which did not
exist here. See 683 S.W.2d at 414-15.
11. 683 S.W.2d at 414-15. The court of criminal appeals noted that no accomplices to the
robbery existed, that the appellant was alone at the time of his arrest, and that no one arrived
to attempt to move the vehicle or remove items from it after the arrest of the appellant. Id.
Furthermore, at least six officers were present at the scene. Id.
12. 683 S.W.2d at 415. Generally, police conducting a caretaking search may inventory
the contents of an impounded vehicle. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-72
(1976).
13. The police had the authority to impound the vehicle, since they had arrested the ap-
pellant, the appellant had no identification, and no one else was present to take possession of
his vehicle. The truck was parked on a bar parking lot, and it matched the description of the
vehicle used in the robbery. 683 S.W.2d at 415.
14. Id. The state carries the burden of proof to show a lawful inventory search. Ward v.
State, 659 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). See Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809,
812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
15. 683 S.W.2d at 415.
16. Id. The court of criminal appeals in Gauldin failed to consider the applicability of the
inevitable discovery doctrine embraced by the court just six months earlier in Miller v. State,
667 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The court in Miller held for the first time that
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II. INVESTIGATORY DETENTIONS
The United States Supreme Court delivered four decisions during the Sur-
vey period which refined the parameters allowing investigatory detentions
upon less than probable cause. In United States v. Sharpe17 the Court held
that not only the quantum of time a suspect is delayed may make a Terry
stop unreasonable, but also whether the police diligently pursue a means of
investigation which would confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.18 In
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez19 the Court held that, in the border
search context, a detention of sixteen hours was not unreasonable when cus-
toms officials believed the suspect was smuggling contraband in her alimen-
tary canal. 20 In United States v. Hensley2l the Court held that investigatory
detentions are applicable to investigations of past crimes, and that police can
make investigative stops based on another law enforcement agency's bulletin
if the agency that issued the bulletin had reasonable suspicion to justify an
investigatory stop.22 Finally, in Hayes v. Florida,2 3 while the Court held that
removing a suspect to the station for fingerprinting without probable cause
fell outside the scope of investigatory detentions, the Court strongly indi-
cated that an on-the-spot fingerprinting of a suspect is permissible on reason-
able suspicion alone.24
The Supreme Court had already approved the investigative detention in
Terry v. Ohio,25 when it found that a stop-and-frisk for weapons without
probable cause was permissible merely upon reasonable suspicion that
"criminal activity may be afoot."'2 6 The Court reasoned that the public in-
terest in police self-protection justifies the frisk as the least intrusive means
to assure the officer that the suspect is unarmed.27 The Court has consist-
ently held that the brevity of the search is a key factor in justifying a Terry
when police seize evidence pursuant to an illegal search, the evidence will nevertheless be
admissible if a court later determines that the police would have ultimately discovered the
evidence. Id. See McColloch, Criminal Procedure: Arrest, Search, and Confessions, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 463, 466-67 (1985). One court of appeals has already relied
on Miller to uphold the admissibility of evidence obtained from an automobile search on the
grounds that the police lawfully impounded the vehicle and would have inevitably discovered
the evidence. Arnold v. State, 686 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985,
pet. granted). Because the application of Miller to the facts presented in Gauldin could have
easily yielded the opposite result, and in light of the recurring nature of automobile searches
and impoundments, the court should have attempted some resolution and accomodation of the
competing considerations of the inevitable discovery doctrine and the state's burden of proof.
Perhaps the court felt no need to address this troublesome question in light of its ultimate
conclusion in Gauldin that the admission of the fruits of the search was harmless error, 683
S.W.2d at 415, or because the prosecution had never raised the issue.
17. 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985).
18. Id. at 1575-76, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 615-16.
19. 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985).
20. Id. at 3312, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 393.
21. 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).
22. Id. at 681, 683, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 612, 615.
23. 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985).
24. Id. at 1646-47, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11.
25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
26. Id. at 30.
27. Id. at 20-27.
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stop because an indefinite detention would constitute a de facto arrest. 28 In
United States v. Sharpe,29 however, the Court rejected the application of any
per se rule limiting the time of an investigative stop.30  Instead, the Court
adopted a test which examined whether police during a detention pursued an
investigatory means likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. 3'
The Court also concluded that any evasive action taken by the suspect to
elude the police could extend the time of the stop without affecting its rea-
sonableness. 32 The Court noted that even if the suspect innocently caused
the delay, the suspect's actions would still permissibly extend the length of
time in which the detention would be considered reasonable. 33 In light of
Sharpe the length of time of an investigatory detention will not be a signifi-
cant factor in determining its reasonableness, so long as the delay in the stop
is traceable to the evasive actions of the suspect.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez34 reflects a poignant application of
this same rationale. In Montoya the Supreme Court held that a sixteen-hour
detention of a suspect, based on the customs officials' reasonable suspicion
that she carried contraband in her alimentary canal, did not violate the rea-
sonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. 35 The Customs officials
gave the defendant the choice of either having an x-ray or producing a stool
sample as a means of dispelling their suspicions. The defendant refused
both 36 and the customs officials, therefore, detained her for sixteen hours
before obtaining a warrant from a magistrate to perform a rectal exam of the
defendant. 37 The exam produced eighty-eight balloons containing 528
grams of cocaine.
While the Montoya decision is distinguishable from Sharpe in that Mon-
toya involved a border search, the Montoya Court did rely on Sharpe to sup-
28. See United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1574-75, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 614-15
(1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-
500 (1983).
29. 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985).
30. Id. at 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 615. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that a 20-minute stop was per se unreasonable. Id.
31. Id. at 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 615-16. The Court cautioned reviewing magistrates not to
second-guess less intrusive means the police could have used in carrying out the search. Id. at
1576, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 616.
32. Id. at 1576, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 616-17. In Sharpe, a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) officer, with the assistance of a local police unit, pulled over two vehicles that he sus-
pected of involvement in transportation of narcotics. The two cars stopped one-half mile apart
causing the DEA officer considerable delay shuttling between the vehicles. The Court held
that the time the DEA officer spent shuttling between the vehicles resulted from the suspects'
evasive actions, and therefore, could not lead to the conclusion that the detention was unrea-
sonably long. Id.
33. Id. at 1576 n.6, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 616 n.6.
34. 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985).
35. Id. at 3312-13, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 393.
36. The dissent by Justice Brennan strongly criticized this finding because the defendant
originally agreed to the x-ray, but subsequently refused when officials insisted that she be
handcuffed en route. Id. at 3313, 3315-16, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 394, 397 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. The customs officials were awaiting her bowel movement. The defendant refused to
succumb in what the court of appeals described as "heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of
nature." United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
105 S. Ct. 3304, 3313, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381, 393 (1985).
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port the proposition that the search was justifiable because of the suspect's
evasive actions. 38 The Court noted that the balance between the government
interest in protecting its borders and the privacy interest of the individual
weighs in favor of the government at the border.39 The Court also expressed
great concern over the difficulty of detecting alimentary canal smuggling.4
When read together, the Sharpe and Montoya decisions arguably expand the
temporal limits of investigatory detentions when compared with the unintru-
sive momentary stop originally approved in Terry v. Ohio.4'
In United States v. Hensley42 the Court held that the police of one depart-
ment could make an investigative detention of a suspect on another police
department's flyer to check the suspect's identification, ask the suspect ques-
tions, or briefly detain the suspect while determining whether an actual war-
rant had been issued.43 Police could make the stop if the police department
issuing the flyer had a reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was in-
volved in an offense.44 The decision appears to expand investigative deten-
tions in two ways. First, the decision allows the use of investigative
detentions to investigate felony offenses that have already occurred. 45 Jus-
tice O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted that the original rationale for
investigative detentions sought to promote society's strong interest in the
detection and prevention of crime. 46 The Court concluded that equally
strong societal interests justified Terry stops to investigate past crimes.47
Second, the Court's decision expands investigative detentions by allowing
the police department receiving the flyer to rely on the reasonable suspicion
of an officer of the department issuing the flyer. The Court's reliance on
Whiteley v. Warden48 indicates that one department could rely on another
department's warrant to arrest a suspect.49 The Court did not find signifi-
cant the distinction that in the warrant situation the receiving police depart-
ment relies on a warrant issued by a magistrate instead of relying only on an
officer's reasonable suspicions. 50 Hensley, therefore, enlarges the scope of
the investigative stop by permitting departments that receive a flyer to stop a
38. 105 S. Ct. at 3312, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 393. The suspect's actions were evasive in that she
refused to consent to the x-ray or give a stool sample. See id., 87 L. Ed. 2d at 392-93.
39. Id. at 3310, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 390.
40. Id. at 3309, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 389-90.
41. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
42. 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).
43. Id. at 683, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 615.
44. Id. The Court ruled that the flyer need not articulate the specific facts supporting the
issuing officials' suspicion because of the need to minimize the volume of information about
suspects. Id. at 682, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 613-14.
45. The Court limited its decision to the investigation of felony crimes reserving judgment
on the investigation of other crimes. Id. at 681, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 612.
46. Id. at 680-81, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 612 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
47. Id. at 681, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 612. Justice O'Connor noted the strong government inter-
est in solving crimes and the public's interest in the prompt arrest of suspects. Id. She also
noted that restraining police until they obtained probable cause would disrupt investigations
and allow suspects an opportunity to flee. Id.
48. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
49. 105 S. Ct. at 682, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 613-14.
50. Id., 83 L. Ed. 2d at 614.
1986]
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suspect of a past crime as long as the agency that issues the flyer had reason-
able suspicion to justify a stop.
In Hayes v. Florida5 ' the Supreme Court provided authority limiting some
aspects and expanding other aspects of the investigative detention. The po-
lice officer's Terry stop in Hayes included taking the defendant to the station
in order to fingerprint him, because police suspected the defendant was in-
volved in a series of burglary-rapes. Justice White, writing for the majority,
held that such a seizure without probable cause violated Davis v. Missis-
sippi.5 2 In Davis, the Court had held that a similar seizure surpassed the
limits of the temporary seizure authorized by Terry.53 The Hayes Court,
however, forged on to say that its holding did not imply that a brief deten-
tion in the field for fingerprinting is necessarily impermissible under the
fourth amendment, when the police base such a detention on reasonable sus-
picion not amounting to probable cause.54 The majority indicated it would
likewise permit a magistrate to authorize the seizure of a person in order to
obtain fingerprints on a showing of less than probable cause. 55
III. INVENTORY SEARCHES
One time-honored exception to the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment for a search of an automobile is the administrative inventory exception.
In South Dakota v. Opperman56 the United States Supreme Court held that
standard police procedures calling for an inventory of the contents of im-
pounded automobiles are acceptable under the fourth amendment due to the
caretaking responsibilities imposed on the police and the lesser expectation
of privacy in automobiles. 57 The inventory search exception allows admis-
sion of evidence discovered by police in the course of a routine inventory
procedure. 58 The purpose of the inventory is to protect police from claims
of lost or damaged goods while the goods are in police possession.5 9 Prob-
able cause is not an issue because, theoretically, the police are not con-
ducting the search to find evidence. 60
In Gill v. State6 1 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that an inven-
tory search could not properly extend to the contents of a locked trunk when
police officials, who were previously denied permission to open the trunk,
forced their way into the trunk by removing the back seat of the car. 62 The
court of criminal appeals has, however, distinguished Gill in several deci-
sions during the Survey period to hold that a locked compartment may be
51. 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985).
52. Id. at 1648, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 711 (upholding Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)).
53. Davis, 394 U.S. at 726-28.
54. 105 S. Ct. at 1647, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11.
55. See id., 84 L. Ed. 2d at 710.
56. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
57. Id. at 367-70, 376.
58. Id. at 366, 376.
59. Id. at 369.
60. See id. at 370 n.5.
61. 625 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
62. Id. at 312.
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opened if the police use the owner's keys to open the compartment. 63 In
each of these cases, all handed down on the same day, the officers were con-
ducting an inventory search pursuant to department policy. The officers
took the driver's keys to open locked compartments apparently without be-
ing granted or denied the driver's permission. 64 The cases each concluded
that the inventory search was necessary to protect police from possible fu-
ture claims by the owner of the vehicle. 65
In Stephen v. State6 6 the police seized a car and entered the trunk after
arresting the driver and determining that the passenger did not have a
driver's license. Pursuant to their department's standard procedure, the of-
ficers impounded the car and, as they awaited the wrecker, conducted an on-
the-spot inventory of the vehicle. One of the officers removed the keys from
the ignition of the car and unlocked the trunk. In the trunk, the officer
discovered a paper bag, which he opened. The bag contained tapes taken in
an earlier robbery. Even though the officer testified he could see into the
bag, 67 the court went on to hold that police could search containers discov-
ered in locked compartments despite the existence of less intrusive
alternatives. 68
In Guillett v. State69 police arrested a driver for driving while intoxicated.
In a subsequent on-the-spot inventory of the contents of the defendant's car
one of the officers took the appellant's car keys and opened the locked glove
compartment where he found narcotics.
In Kelley v. State70 officers arrested a driver for DWI and the driver's
passenger for possession of a prohibited weapon. In a subsequent inventory
search of the car one of the officers obtained the keys to the locked trunk in
which he discovered a sawed-off shotgun.
IV. STANDING To CONTEST SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Survey period saw further refinements in the procedural requisites
involved in litigation of standing to contest an illegal search or seizure. The
refinements particularly concerned whether the government can challenge a
defendant's standing for the first time on appeal. This troublesome ques-
tion7' has now led to the adoption of entirely different rules for state and
63. Kelley v. State, 677 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Stephen v. State, 677
S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Guillett v. State, 677 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984).
64. Kelly, 677 S.W.2d at 37; Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 43; Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 48.
65. Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37; Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 44; Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 49.
66. 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
67. Once the court permitted the police to open the trunk, the contents of the bag could
have been admitted under the "plain view" doctrine, which allows police to seize evidence in
plain view during a legal search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971).
68. 677 S.W.2d at 44-45 (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)).
69. 677 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
70. 677 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
71. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has switched positions three times on this issue
in the last ten years. In Maldonado v. State, 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), the
court held that the state may not raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal. Id. at




In Wilson v. State72 a bare majority of the court of criminal appeals held
that the state may attack the defendant's standing for the first time on ap-
peal. 73 In reaching this decision the court distinguished the rule most re-
cently formulated by the United States Supreme Court that the government
forfeits the right to contest a defendant's standing through assertions, con-
cessions, or even acquiescence in the trial court.74 Because the Supreme
Court has also emphasized in recent years that a privacy interest in the thing
or premises searched is a substantive element of a defendant's fourth amend-
ment claim and must be proven by the defendant, 75 the court of criminal
appeals determined that the prosecution's mere silence on the issue of stand-
ing in the trial court should not prevent the state from arguing a lack of
standing in the appellate courts. 76
In the wake of the Wilson decision the disposition of standing disputes can
take several alternative courses on appeal. If the evidence uncontrovertedly
demonstrates that the defendant lacks standing, the state can raise the issue
for the first time on appeal, and an appellate court will sustain the trial
1978), that the state may indeed contest a defendant's standing to challenge a search for the
first time on appeal. Id. at 704. In Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
(opinion on original submission), the court returned to the rule that the state cannot challenge
a defendant's standing for the first time on appeal, adding the modification that the state can
raise the issue on appeal only when the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant
lacked standing to challenge the search. Id. at 663-64. In its opinion on rehearing in Wilson,
id. at 666-71, the court has now held that the state may, after all, challenge standing for the
first time on appeal. Id. at 669.
72. 692 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
73. Id. at 669.
74. Id. at 668. The Supreme Court established the rule in Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 211 (1981). The Supreme Court in Steagald also held, however, that the government
may lose its right to challenge standing "when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely
fashion during litigation." Id. at 209. The court of criminal appeals ignored this aspect of the
Steagald holding in its analysis in Wilson.
75. In 1972 the Court noted that such fourth amendment analysis "focuses on the extent
of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoreti-
cally separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 139 (1978). The Rakas Court made clear that the question of a defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy is an issue going to the merits of his fourth amendment claim and that
the burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing or premises searched is
on the defendant in all cases. See id. at 138-40, 148-50. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980) (defendant bears burden of proving he has privacy interest in object
searched); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968) (fourth amendment rights
enforced only at instance of one who legitimately occupies premises searched).
76. See 692 S.W.2d at 669. The Wilson court also seized upon the 1972 per curiam opin-
ion of Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972) as direct authority for its conclusion. The
trial court in Combs denied the defendant's motion to suppress, and the government argued for
the first time on appeal that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the validity of the
search. Id. at 226-27. The Supreme Court's review of the record did not reveal sufficient
evidence upon which to decide the standing issue. Id. at 227. The Court observed that the
defendant's failure to prove his privacy interest, either at trial or at the pre-trial suppression
hearing, was possibly caused by the failure of the government to challenge the defendant's
standing in the trial court. Id. The Court resolved the problem by remanding the case to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the standing issue. Id. at 227-28. Since the Supreme
Court decided Combs before Rakas, that the Court would follow the remand approach today is
highly doubtful.
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court's rejection of the fourth amendment claim. 77 Conversely, if the evi-
dence conclusively demonstrates that the defendant does have standing to
contest the search, the state's challenge to the defendant's standing must
ultimately fail, regardless of the state's right to raise the issue for the first
time on appeal. 78 In cases involving a genuine factual dispute as to the de-
fendant's expectation of privacy, the state will not have waived its right to
challenge the defendant's standing, despite its silence on the issue, unless it
has made contrary factual assertions or has otherwise effectively stipulated
standing in the trial court.79 When the evidence on this point is sufficiently
controverted, the appellate court is obliged to affirm the trial court's rejec-
tion of the defendant's factual showing and find a lack of standing.80 Fi-
nally, when the record contains insufficient evidence or no evidence on
which to determine the defendant's standing, the defendant will simply have
failed to sustain his burden of proof to show he possessed the requisite expec-
tation of privacy in the thing or premises searched.81
The Wilson standards do not apply, however, in Texas federal prosecu-
tions. The Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Amuny 82 that it has no
intention of abandoning the traditional requirement that the government
raise standing in the trial court.83 The Fifth Circuit continues to presume
that the defendant has standing to challenge a fourth amendment violation
unless the government specifically raises the issue in the district court.84 The
77. See Sullivan v. State, 564 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). This scenario
would include situations wherein the fact are uncontroverted or the trial court has made spe-
cific findings in favor of the state on any disputed factual issues involving the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
78. Indeed, this was the result in Wilson, where the court of criminal appeals concluded
that the prosecution had satisfied the defendant's burden of production on the issue in cross-
examination of the defendant at the suppression hearing. 692 S.W.2d at 671. The court made
clear that, in such circumstances, the defendant need not do more to meet his burden of per-
suasion on the issue unless the record shows that the trial court rejected the credibility of the
defendant's testimony on that issue. Id.
79. See id. at 668-69.
80. The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and other evidence
adduced at a suppression hearing. See Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980).
81. This result is likely even though the court of criminal appeals in Wilson quoted ap-
provingly from the Supreme Court's opinion in Combs, wherein the Court observed that a
defendant's failure to assert and prove standing in the trial court is normally attributable to the
government's failure to challenge his standing in the first place. 692 S.W.2d at 669 (citing
Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (per curiam)).
82. 767 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 1121-22. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected the government's standing
challenges when the government did not raise the issue in the district court. See United States
v. Settegast, 755 F.2d 1117, 1119 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mendoza, 722 F.2d 96,
97 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 83 n.6 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Sanchez, 689 F.2d 508, 509 n.l (5th Cir. 1982).
84. 767 F.2d at 1121-22. Normally an appellate court will not hear a claim raised for the
first time on appeal. See Self v. Blackburn, 751 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Parker, 722 F.2d 179, 183 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit continues to cling to this
traditional waiver rule, apparently viewing this issue as a matter of ordinary appellate review
procedure, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), notwithstanding. See supra note 75 (Rakas




government in Amuny fell into the very trap of which the Supreme Court
had warned in Steagald v. United States,8 5 that the government may lose its
right to raise on appeal the issue of the defendant's standing when the prose-
cution has made a contrary assertion in the trial court.8 6 In Amuny the
government prevented the defendant from establishing standing in the dis-
trict court by expressly conceding that the defendant possessed standing.8 7
The government's conduct thus constituted more than mere waiver, causing
the Fifth Circuit to hold that the government forfeited its right to challenge
the defendant's standing on appeal.8 8
V. VEHICLE SEARCHES
The Supreme Court in California v. Carney89 ended speculation and con-
fusion as to whether courts should consider a motor home an automobile or
a home for fourth amendment purposes. The Court held that a motor home
could constitute a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement if it was readily mobile and in a setting that indicated the vehi-
cle's use for transportation. 90 The Court's decision reflects the Court's con-
tinued retrenchment of fourth amendment protections.
The fourth amendment guarantees individuals freedom from unreasonable
searches or seizures. 9 1 Generally, a reasonable search calls for a warrant
supported by probable cause and obtained from a neutral and detached mag-
istrate. If law enforcement officials fail to obtain a warrant, or probable
cause does not support the warrant, then any evidence obtained by the
search is inadmissible as evidence. 92 In Carroll v. United States93 the
Supreme Court established the automobile exception to the warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment. 94 The automobile exception permits the
warrantless search of a vehicle based on probable cause. 95 In Carroll the
Court reasoned that an automobile was entitled to a lesser degree of protec-
tion than a home because a suspect could use an automobile's mobility to
circumvent a search by law enforcement officials by removing the vehicle
from the jurisdiction before officials could obtain a search warrant.96 In
South Dakota v. Opperman97 the Court recognized another justification for
the automobile exception. 98 The Opperman Court noted that a lesser expec-
85. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
86. See id. at 209.
87. 767 F.2d at 1121.
88. Id. at 1122.
89. 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985).
90. Id. at 2070-71, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 415.
91. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
92. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
93. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
94. See id. at 149.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 153.
97. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
98. In Opperman police impounded an abandoned vehicle on the highway. In the im-
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tation of privacy exists in an automobile than in a home because of the per-
vasive regulation of vehicles traveling on the public highways. 99 Officials,
therefore, may search an automobile without a warrant because of the re-
duced expectation of privacy in an automobile.' °0
Previous decisions left a question unanswered: when does an automobile
take on enough characteristics of a home so that it really does not fit under
the automobile exception, but belongs under the general rule requiring a
warrant for the search? The Court answered part of this question in Carney.
The case involved a warrantless search of a mini-motor home. The motor
home sat on a downtown San Diego parking lot and had all of its windows
curtained, including the windshield. Police officers made a warrantless
search of the motor home on the suspicion that inside the motor home the
occupant was exchanging marijuana for sex with youths. The officers dis-
covered marijuana in the vehicle, and the defendant was subsequently con-
victed for possession.' 10  The California Supreme Court found the
warrantless search violative of the fourth amendment on the grounds that
the automobile exception should not include mobile homes because they en-
tail a higher expectation of privacy than an ordinary automobile. 10 2 The
general rule established by the fourth amendment against warrantless
searches therefore prevailed, and the court suppressed the evidence obtained
from the warrantless search.10 3
The United States Supreme Court examined the underlying justifications
for the automobile exception and concluded that this motor home came
within the justifications. 10 4 The motor home was readily mobile and, as a
licensed motor vehicle, was subject to extensive governmental regulation. 0 5
The Court acknowledged the motor home possessed many attributes of a
home but nevertheless concluded that as a readily mobile, licensed motor
vehicle it fell within the scope of the automobile exception. 10 6 The Court
expressly rejected the exclusion of a vehicle from the exception merely be-
cause the vehicle might also have the capability of functioning as a home.10 7
Specifically, the Court held that if a vehicle is mobile and in a setting that
objectively indicates the vehicle's use for transportation, the vehicle excep-
tion to the warrant requirement will apply. 10 8 The Court left unexplained
pound lot, officers conducted a warrantless inventory search of the contents of the car in order
to protect the contents and to shield the police from any claims of liability for their loss. The
search resulted in the discovery of a bag of marijuana.
99. 428 U.S. at 367-68. The Court could not rely on the mobility justification because
police effectively immobilized the vehicle under consideration by impounding it.
100. Id.
101. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2067-68, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 411 (1985).
102. 34 Cal. 3d 597, 606-10, 668 P.2d 807, 811-14, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 504-07 (1983), rev'd,
105 S. Ct. 2066, 2071, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 415 (1985).
103. Id. at 613-14, 668 P.2d at 817, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
104. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 415.
105. Id. at 2070, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 414.
106. Id.
107. Id., 85 L. Ed. 2d at 414-15. The Court believed any such distinction would turn
merely on the size and quality of appointments of the vehicle and would not reflect whether
the vehicle was actually used as a residence. Id.
108. Id. at 2070-71, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 415.
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exactly what constitutes an objective indication of use for transportation.
The Court expressly refused to pass on the situation wherein a vehicle is
used in a way that objectively indicates its use as a residence. 10 9 The Court
hinted that relevant factors would include the vehicle's location, its mobility
(noting specifically whether it sat on blocks), if it was licensed, if it was con-
nected to utilities, and whether it had convenient access to a public road.I10
Presumably, the presence of most of these elements would militate against a
finding of mobility and objectively indicate a primary use for residential pur-
poses rather than transportation.
VI. ROADBLOCKS
The use of roadblocks by law enforcement agencies, primarily for the pur-
pose of detecting and apprehending DWI offenders, has become increasingly
popular since the United States Supreme Court's dicta in Delaware v.
Prouse,1 1 suggesting that non-random stops for the purpose of checking
driver's licenses might pass constitutional muster. 1 2 The Court in Prouse
specifically held that detaining an automobile and driver in order to check
the driver's license and the automobile's registration is unreasonable under
the fourth amendment except when police possess articulable and reasonable
suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or that an automobile is unregistered
or otherwise in violation of the law.' 13 The Court noted, however, that its
holding did not prevent officials from developing methods for spot checks
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion of police officers,
specifically stating that questioning all traffic at roadblock-type stops is a
possible alternative." 14
Both the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and one intermediate appellate
court addressed the constitutionality of roadblocks during the Survey period.
In Meeks v. State 15 the court of criminal appeals considered a challenge to a
multi-purpose roadblock. The defendant based the challenge on both the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9,
of the Texas Constitution. 1 6 Numerous state and local law enforcement
agencies conducted the roadblock, working together to enforce all the laws
and not only to check for driver's licenses. 1 7 To justify the roadblock the
state relied upon Article 6687b, section 13,118 which purports to allow any
peace officer to detain a motor vehicle operator for a driver's license
109. Id. at 2071 n.3, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 415 n.3.
110. Id.
111. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
112. Id. at 663.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 692 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
116. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9 generally corresponds to the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution.
117. 692 S.W.2d at 507. The officers admitted that the purpose of the roadblock included
checking for DWI's, fugitives, stolen vehicles, and felony violations. Id.
118. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 13 (Vernon 1977).
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check. 119
Without resorting to an analysis of the validity of Article 6687b under
Prouse120 the court of criminal appeals unanimously held that the statute did
not authorize the roadblock stops since a license check was not the sole rea-
son for the detention. 12' The court stressed that "a driver's license check
may not be used as a subterfuge to cover up an unlawful stop based on mere
suspicion unsupported by articulable facts necessary for an investigative de-
tention."1 22 Although the continued viability of Article 6687b, section 13 is
highly doubtful in light of Prouse, this multi-purpose roadblock could not
pass muster even under the statute's broad terms. 123
On the same day as the Meeks decision the Dallas Court of Appeals
handed down the first Texas case to address the constitutionality of a DWI
roadblock since Prouse. In Webb v. State124 the officer who coordinated the
roadblock admitted that the real purpose of the roadblock was to ferret out
DWI offenders. 125 The court of appeals was able again to avoid the question
of the constitutionality of the driver's license check statute after Prouse,
since the roadblock was not a mere license check. The court correctly noted
that the constitutionality of DWI roadblocks, as with all warrantless
searches and seizures, is generally determined by balancing the legitimate
governmental interests against the degree of intrusion on the individual's
fourth amendment rights. 126 The court then proceeded to apply this balanc-
ing test to the roadblock at issue under the three-pronged analysis set forth
by the United States Supreme Court several years earlier in Brown v.
Texas. 127 Under Brown a court must consider the public concern that the
seizure serves, the degree to which the seizure promotes the public interest,
119. "Any peace officer may stop and detain any motor vehicle operator for the purpose of
determining whether such person has a driver's license as required by this Section." Id.
120. Because the trial in Meeks occurred prior to the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in
Prouse, the court of criminal appeals deemed it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality
of the statute or the roadblock itself pursuant to the Prouse analysis. 692 S.W.2d at 508. The
court of criminal appeals had already held that Prouse would not have retroactive application
or effect. McMillan v. State, 609 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Luckett v. State,
586 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
121. 692 S.W.2d at 508.
122. Id.; see McMillan v. State, 609 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Hall v. State,
488 S.W.2d 788, 789-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
123. In a number of pre-Prouse opinions, the court of criminal appeals upheld the validity
of stops under art. 6687b, § 13, when police made the stops solely to determine whether the
driver had a valid driver's license or to determine the fitness of the driver and vehicle. See, e.g.,
Luckett v. Statute, 586 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (officer suspected driver did
not have license); Rezo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (license check
roadblock); Tardiff v. State, 548 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (license check road-
block); Leonard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (police stopped vehicle
solely for license check); Oliver v. State, 455 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (routine
license check).
124. 695 S.W.2d 676, (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, pet. filed).
125. The court thus summarily concluded that the resultant detentions were not author-
ized under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 13 (Vernon Supp. 1985). 695 S.W.2d at
678.
126. 695 S.W.2d at 678; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
127. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
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and the degree of interference with individual liberty caused by the
seizure. 12s
Application of this balancing test led the Webb court to conclude that the
DWI roadblock ran afoul of the fourth amendment. 29 Indeed, the court
found that the state failed to satisfy its burden of proof as to each element of
the Brown test. 130 The public interest in the type of DWI roadblock con-
ducted in Webb did not outweigh the individual's right to be free from intru-
sion, since the record failed to reflect any facts concerning the extent of the
problem of intoxicated drivers in the area of the roadblock. 13' Likewise, the
state made no showing as to the degree to which the seizure advanced the
public interest. The state introduced no evidence to establish the superiority
of the roadblock over less intrusive alternative means of deterrence1 32 such
as random patrol stops based on probable cause.' 33
Assessment of whether the public interest served sufficiently justified the
particular intrusion led the court to fashion its own three-part test involving
inquiry into (1) the type of checkpoint involved, (2) the checkpoint's pur-
pose, and (3) the degree of intrusion and fright imposed upon persons going
through the checkpoint. 134 The court determined that the roadblock was
temporary, 35 the primary purpose for the roadblock was to check for DWI
offenders,136 and the roadblock subjected the detainees to a moderately high
degree of intrusion and fear.' 37 The Webb court thus concluded that, with-
out evidence that police used an objective, non-discretionary procedure to
conduct the roadblock, the detention of vehicles at the roadblock violated
128. 695 S.W.2d at 678 (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 450-51). This three-pronged mode of
analysis assures that officers in the field cannot arbitrarily invade an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy. 695 S.W.2d at 678 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55
(1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975); Camera v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
129. 695 S.W.2d at 683. Although the appellant relied upon both the fourth amendment of
the United States Constitution and article I, § 9, of the Texas Constitution in his attack on the
validity of his detention, the court's analysis indicates that the court based the holding only on
the interpretation of the strictures of the fourth amendment. See 695 S.W.2d at 683.
130. 695 S.W.2d at 681-83. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show facts author-
izing a warrantless seizure. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1971);
DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Koonce v. State, 651 S.W.2d 46,
47 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no pet.).
131. 695 S.W.2d at 681. The court implied that the introduction of statistical evidence
concerning the nature and extent of the DWI problem in the area of the roadblock could cure
this record deficiency. Id.
132. Id. at 682. The court noted that "[n]othing in the record indicates that the only prac-
tical or effective means of apprehending drunk drivers is by arbitrarily subjecting all citizens to
police scrutiny without suspicion of wrongdoing simply because they happen to be traveling on
a particular road at a certain time." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The roadblock was not the type of permanent checkpoint approved in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (permanent checkpoint at border).
136. Although the record reflected that the Dallas Police Department characterized the
roadblock as a routine driver's license check, the state's only witness at the suppression hearing
admitted that the true purpose of the roadblock was, in fact, to check for DWrs. 695 S.W.2d
at 682.
137. Id. at 682-83. The court noted that the only factor supporting the constitutionality of
the roadblock was that the police stopped every car. Id. at 683.
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the fourth amendment. 138 The court noted that such activities by law en-
forcement authorities, while commendable in their ultimate goal of removing
DWI offenders from the public roads, come dangerously close to conditions
in a police state.139
Another panel of the same court of appeals, however, reached the opposite
conclusion several months later and upheld the constitutional validity of a
roadblock. In Carter v. State'4° a selective enforcement unit devoted to the
apprehension of DWI offenders conducted the roadblock. The unit included
a certified intoxilyzer operator. A police van was at the location of the road-
block for the purpose of transporting arrestees, and the police conducted the
roadblock operation on a thoroughfare containing numerous bars and liquor
stores. One of the officers testified that he had informed the mass media that
the purpose of such checkpoint operations was "to get the drunks off the
road.1'41 Despite these circumstances the officers testified at a suppression
hearing that their sole purpose in conducting the roadblock was to check
driver's licenses. 142 They testified that traffic in both directions was stopped,
even though only the traffic from one direction came from an area contain-
ing bars and liquor stores. They also testified that they conducted the road-
block in issue during the late afternoon on a Saturday, whereas the best time
to catch intoxicated drivers was just after midnight. 143 The court of appeals
considered these claims by the officers in their testimony as providing a suffi-
cient basis upon which to uphold the validity of the roadblock. 144 Ordina-
rily, a trial court may believe the testimony supporting its ruling and
disbelieve conflicting testimony, absent an abuse of discretion. 14 Because an
appellate court will generally sustain a judge's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence if any basis in the record supports it,146 the officers' testimony that
the sole purpose of the roadblock was to check drivers' licenses carried the
day over the dissent's complaint that the evidence, taken as a whole, clearly
showed that the roadblock was "a thinly veiled operation to enforce the
DWI laws."' 147 The opinions in Webb and Carter, along with decisions from
other jurisdictions confronting this question, 148 demonstrate that the validity
138. Id. at 683. The court's hostility to roadblocks of this sort was made manifest by a
dictum in which the majority observed that "[i]f roadblocks can be maintained to stop all
persons, regardless of how innocent their conduct for the purpose of investigating or arresting
drunk drivers, then presumably similar stops of all citizens could be undertaken for question-
ing and surveillance with regard to other crimes, such as possession of narcotics, possession of
stolen property, or burglary." Id. (citing State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1,
663 P.2d 992, 997 (1983) (Feldman, J., specially concurring)).
139. 695 S.W.2d at 683.
140. 700 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no pet.).
141. Id. at 294 (Howell, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 291.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 291-92.
145. Id. at 291 (citing Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980);
Zepeda v. State, 638 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.)).
146. 700 S.W.2d at 291 (citing Nickerson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 1983), aftd, 660 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).
147. 700 S.W.2d at 293 (Howell, J., dissenting).
148. A survey of decisions on this issue from other jurisdictions indicates a roughly even
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of such roadblocks must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The nature of
the proof introduced by the prosecution concerning the manner in which
police conduct the roadblock and the subjective intent of the officers in
charge will constitute the pivotal factors, pending further pronouncements
from the court of criminal appeals or the United States Supreme Court.
VII. BODY SEARCHES
In Winston v. Lee149 the United States Supreme Court held that compelled
surgery to remove a bullet from a defendant's shoulder constituted an unrea-
sonable search under the fourth amendment.150 The controversy arose when
a shop owner exchanged shots with an assailant. The shop owner sustained
a wound but he also wounded the assailant in his left side. The defendant
was found eight blocks from the incident with a bullet wound in the left
shoulder. He claimed that robbers shot him. The defendant arrived at the
hospital emergency room where the shop owner was receiving treatment.
When the defendant entered the room, the shop owner identified the defend-
ant as the assailant. Police arrested the defendant for attempted robbery.
The state subsequently attempted, through a series of hearings, to compel
the defendant to undergo surgery for the removal of the bullet for identifica-
tion purposes.
The Court noted the fourth amendment neither allows nor forbids such an
intrusion, but merely governs the reasonableness of the intrusion.' 5' The
Court found that, when the search is a surgical intrusion under the skin, the
analysis in Schmerber v. California152 is determinative. 153 In Schmerber the
Court had permitted the extraction of blood from an unconsenting defend-
ant in order to test his blood alcohol level. 154 The Schmerber Court had
split. A number of recent opinions from other state courts have upheld DWI roadblocks. See
State v. Bartley, 109 I11. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880, 889 (1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,
673 P.2d 1174, 1186 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1105 (1984); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483
N.E.2d 1102, 1108 (1985); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (1980);
People v. Scott, 122 Misc. 2d 731, 471 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1983), affd, 63
N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984); People v. Peil, 122 Misc. 2d 617, 471
N.Y.S.2d 632, 535 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1984). Other state courts, however, have found the conduct
of the DWI roadblock in question violative of the fourth amendment. See State ex rel. Ek-
strom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983); State v. McLaughlin, 471
N.E.2d 1125, 1141-42 (Ind. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449
N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 979-80, 983 (N.H. 1985) (court noted
that its state constitution provides more protection than the fourth amendment against state
intrusion); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 665 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Olgaard, 248
N.W.2d 392, 395 (S.D. 1976); State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225, 227-28
(1985). As also reflected by the Webb and Carter opinions, much of the variance in the courts'
rulings on DWI roadblocks is attributable to the particular manner in which police conducted
the roadblocks, as reflected in the evidence adduced in each case. The decisions thus do not
necessarily reveal per se acceptance or rejection of such roadblocks.
149. 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985).
150. Id. at 1620, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 673.
151. Id. at 1616, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 669.
152. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
153. 105 S. Ct. at 1616, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 668-69.
154. 384 U.S. at 772.
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noted that the threshold requirement of such a search is a warrant supported
by probable cause, absent exigent circumstances. 55  The Winston court
therefore balanced the extent of the threat to the defendant's safety and the
intrusion on his dignity and privacy against the effectiveness of the proce-
dure to determine guilt or innocence. 156 When the Court applied that test to
the facts, it found that the risk of the surgery outweighed the evidentiary
value of the bullet.' 57 The Court's decision in Winston is instructive because
it recognizes that a search beneath the skin may be constitutionally reason-
able and establishes some guidelines for lower courts to follow in dealing
with this type of search.
VIII. INTERROGATION AND INVOCATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Supreme Court held in Edwards v. Arizona'5 8 in 1981 that once an
accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial inter-
rogation the accused does not waive that right by responding to interroga-
tion, even if the police have advised him of his rights.159 After an accused
has expressed his desire to communicate with the police only through coun-
sel, police may not subject him to further interrogation until counsel is avail-
able to him, unless the defendant himself initiates the communication with
the police.' 60 The question of waiver thus turns on whether the state has
met its heavy burden of establishing a conscious waiver of a known right or
privilege, a matter that a court must decide upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. 16 1 Since Edwards the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
consistently held that the state has not met this burden unless the evidence
clearly shows that the accused himself initiated the conversation or exchange
that resulted in any incriminating statement at issue. 162 When the record is
silent or unclear as to which party initiated the exchange, the court will find
no waiver. 163
The court of criminal appeals again confronted this issue during the Sur-
vey period in Bush v. State.164 In Bush the court held that the defendant did
not initiate a communication within the waiver context by responding to an
155. Id. at 770-71. In Pesina v. State, 676 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), the court of
criminal appeals followed Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), in holding
that the exigency created by natural body processes permits a warrantless blood test to deter-
mine the blood alcohol level of an unconscious suspect not under arrest if probable cause exists
that the suspect is intoxicated. Pesina, 676 S.W.2d at 124-26 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291, 296 (1973)).
156. 105 S. Ct. at 1617-18, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 669-70.
157. Id. at 1618-20, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 670-73.
158. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
159. Id. at 484.
160. Id. at 484-85.
161. Id. at 482 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 1938)). Some of the relevant
circumstances include the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Edwards, 451
U.S. at 482 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464).
162. See Phifer v. State, 651 S.W.2d 774, 780-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Coleman v. State,
646 S.W.2d 937, 940-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
163. See Phifer v. State, 651 S.W.2d 774, 780-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Coleman v. State,
646 S.W.2d 937, 940-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
164. 697 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
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officer's hard luck story that was designed to invoke the incriminating state-
ment.1 65 In Bush the defendant was arraigned, but refused to waive any of
his rights until he had seen an attorney. The police transported the defend-
ant to a neighboring county for another arraignment. Throughout the trip
one of the officers unsuccessfully tried to persuade the defendant to divulge
the location of the murder weapon. The officer told the defendant that to
reveal the location would save everyone much trouble. The officer then
changed the discussion to an article in a magazine about an arrest that the
officer had made, but that gave the credit for the arrest to another officer.
After hearing the story the defendant told the officer he would make him a
hero and told him the location of the gun. The trial court admitted the
defendant's statement and the gun and convicted the defendant of
murder. ' 66
On appeal the state argued that the defendant initiated the conversation
which led to the admission because fifteen minutes lapsed between the inter-
rogation by the officer concerning the weapon and the admission by the de-
fendant. 167 The court rejected this argument based on a finding that during
the fifteen-minute lapse in questioning the officer was relating the magazine
story.' 68 The court found the conversation as a whole during the entire trip
was designed to obtain this information from the defendant.' 69 The court
therefore concluded that the state had not met its burden of proving the
defendant initiated the conversation or otherwise knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his right to the presence of counsel at the interrogation.' 70
In a surprising display of judicial bravado the Beaumont Court of Appeals
openly castigated the court of criminal appeals' opinion in Bush and flouted
the Supreme Court's rationale in Edwards and its progeny. In Morris v.
State'7' the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing revealed that after
his arrest for burglary of a habitation the defendant asked officials to allow
him to contact his lawyer, but officials refused the request. He was then
transferred to the San Jacinto County Sheriff's Department where his re-
quest for counsel was again refused. Inexplicably, the defendant was subse-
quently transferred to the custody of the Polk County Sheriff's Department
where his request was also denied. Finally, officials moved the defendant to
the Tyler County Sheriff's Department where his request was once more
denied and where he signed a written confession as a result of custodial in-
165. Id. at 403. The facts in Bush are similar to those in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387(1977), in which the Supreme Court held an admission by a defendant inadmissible when
elicited by the "Christian burial" speech of a police officer. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 405-06. The
Brewer Court based its holding, however, on the defendant's sixth amendment right to assist-
ance of counsel once judicial proceedings are initiated, not the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and right to counsel principles involved in Bush. See Brewer, 430
U.S. at 397-99.
166. Bush, 697 S.W.2d at 399-401. The trial judge ruled that the police officers did not
interrogate the defendant during the trip. Id, at 401.
167. Id. at 401-02.
168. Id. at 403.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 697 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, pet. filed) (opinion on remand).
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terrogation. The state failed to elicit any testimony to the contrary. The
court of appeals rebuked the court of criminal appeals for its decision in
Bush, finding that Bush's statement during his conversation with the officer
that Bush would make a hero out of the officer made Bush the initiator of
the conversation. 172 Furthermore, the court dispensed with Edwards v. Ari-
zona's focus on whether the state has proven that the defendant initiated the
conversation that resulted in a confession, apparently believing that more
recent Supreme Court case authority has greatly diluted the Edwards stric-
tures. 173 The court bemoaned the Edwards doctrine as placing another on-
erous burden on Texas law enforcement, since the doctrine defeats the
admissibility of custodial confessions when the evidence shows that the ac-
cused requested but was refused the right to confer with counsel.' 74 Rather
than reverse the conviction for the state's failure to meet its burden of prov-
ing that the defendant initiated the conversation that led to the confession
after his repeated requests for counsel, the Beaumont court remanded the
case to the trial court with the suggestion that the trial court enter a finding
of fact rejecting the defendant's uncontradicted testimony that he had re-
quested counsel.' 75 The court made the suggestion despite the failure of the
prosecution to call any witnesses to rebut the defendant's testimony. 76 The
court has thereby attempted to evade completely the constitutional require-
ments of Edwards, eliminating the prosecution's burden of proof by urging
the trial court to reject the uncontroverted evidence that the defendant was
denied counsel. 1
77
Two of the most significant self-incrimination issues addressed by the
172. Id. at 692.
173. Id. The Morris court opined that Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982), and Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), limited Edwards, but for reasons that are not clear. See 697
S.W.2d at 692.
174. See 697 S.W.2d at 693.
175. Id. at 694 (on state's motion for rehearing). The court of appeals at first reluctantly
reversed and remanded the case with a zealous recommendation that the court of criminal
appeals, on discretionary review, remand the case to the trial court so that the trial court could
enter findings rejecting the uncontroverted evidence of the defendant's requests for counsel.
Id. at 692-93 (opinion on remand). A month later, on the state's motion for rehearing, the
court of appeals decided to remand the case to give the trial court the right to disbelieve the
appellant. Id. at 694 (on state's motion for rehearing).
176. See 697 S.W.2d at 690-91. The court's misunderstanding of Edwards and Bush is
manifested by its statement that whenever a defendant asserts at a suppression hearing that he
requested counsel prior to giving a custodial confession, "the net effect [under Edwards] would
be that the prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and peace officers of the State of Texas will,
as a practical matter, absolutely have to cease to investigate even serious atrocious crimes
insofar as, but only insofar as, questioning the defendant." Id. at 692-93. The court obviously
failed to recognize that Edwards and its progeny provide the state with the opportunity to
controvert the defendant's evidence regarding his request for counsel and the initiation of the
exchange during which the confession occurred. In Morris, after the defendant met his burden
of production on these issues, the state failed to adduce any evidence to meet its burden of
proof and, indeed, failed to elicit the testimony of any of the police officers who could have
effectively controverted the defendant's testimony. See id. at 690-91.
177. The court of criminal appeals generally accepts that
whenever the accused's testimony reflects that he was unlawfully caused to
make a written confession, and his testimony is uncontradicted, then the ac-
cused's written confession is inadmissible evidence as a matter of law. If, how-
ever, the facts are controverted as to whether the written confession was taken
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court of criminal appeals during the Survey period involved whether a third
party can effectively invoke a defendant's fifth amendment right to counsel
and whether the failure of law enforcement officials to notify an accused of
the availability of counsel during custodial interrogation affects the volun-
tary and knowing nature of a waiver of right to counsel. Both questions
arose in Dunn v. State, 7 8 in which the court held that a third party could
not invoke a defendant's fifth amendment right to counsel 179 and that the
failure of police to inform a defendant that an attorney had been retained for
him did not affect the voluntariness of the waiver of the right against self-
incrimination.' 0  The circumstances surrounding the presence of counsel
and the failure of police to inform the defendant of his presence may, how-
ever, have a bearing on whether the defendant made a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of his right against self-incrimination. '8' In Dunn a majority of
the court held that the circumstances vitiated the waiver, rendering the con-
fession inadmissible. 182
The defendant in Dunn went to the police station at 6:00 p.m. at the re-
quest of the police. The police informed the defendant of his Miranda
rights 8 3 and placed him in a line-up. The defendant then underwent ap-
proximately three hours of questioning and several more Miranda warnings.
At 10:35 an officer began typing the defendant's confession, and the defend-
ant signed it at 12:17 a.m. The defendant waived his right to counsel but
police never informed him that they had prevented two attorneys from see-
ing him.
At 10:00 that evening the defendant's wife discovered her husband was in
in accordance with the law, then the issue is one of fact to be first determined by
the trial judge.
Moore v. State, 700 S.W.2d 193, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). In the traditional voluntariness
inquiry under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964), the test is whether the state met
its burden of proof to controvert the defendant's claim that the state obtained his confession
unlawfully. See Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 184, 88 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1985); Dykes v. State, 657 S.W.2d 796, 796-97 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983); Darden v. State, 629 S.W.2d 46, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Barton v. State, 605
S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Harville v. State, 591 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979). The court of criminal appeals has thus always reversed convictions for
improper admission of a confession when the state has failed to controvert the defendant's
testimony that his confession was obtained unlawfully. See Smith v. State, 547 S.W. 2d 6, 8-9
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Sherman v. State, 532 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Farr
v. State, 519 S.W.2d 876, 880-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Only when the state controverts the
testimony of the defendant on this point may the trial judge resolve the disputed facts one way
or the other. See Moore v. State, 700 S.W.2d 193, 202-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Because
the Beaumont Court of Appeals took the opposite approach in Morris the precedential value of
the case is, at best, unclear.
178. 696 SAW.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
179. Id. at 567.
180. Id. at 568.
181. Id. at 568-70.
182. Id. The Dunn court split 3-1-1-1-3, but the three concurring members all apparently
agreed with the plurality that the defendant made an invalid, unknowing waiver of counsel by
virtue of the police officers' refusal to inform him that attorneys retained for him were present
and attempting to make contact. See id. at 570 (Clinton, J., concurring); id. at 574 (Teague, J.,
concurring); id. at 575 (Miller, J., concurring).
183. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Miranda requirements.
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custody and contacted a lawyer, who had previously represented the defend-
ant in a commercial matter, to represent her husband. He called another
attorney, a criminal law specialist, and that attorney immediately contacted
the police officers who were with the defendant. The attorney told the of-
ficers that he represented the defendant and that they were not to question
the defendant until he arrived. The two attorneys arrived shortly before
11:00 p.m. and police told them that the defendant was in the jail area. The
attorneys proceeded to the jail area but officers informed them that the de-
fendant was not in the jail. The attorneys then learned the defendant was in
an adjacent room being questioned and they demanded to see him, but the
officers refused. The attorneys then tried in a myriad of ways to inform the
defendant of their presence, including sending the defendant telegrams. Offi-
cials thwarted all of the attorneys' attempts. 184
The court first considered whether the defendant's wife could invoke the
defendant's right to counsel. The issue was one of first impression in
Texas,185 although many other jurisdictions had addressed the issue.' 8 6 The
court decided that a defendant's right against self-incrimination is a personal
right that cannot be asserted or waived by anyone except the accused. 187
The defendant's confession was therefore voluntary because he waived his
right to counsel and made the confession of his own volition. s8 8 The fact
that the defendant had two attorneys who wanted to speak with him but
were prevented from doing so by the police had no effect on the voluntari-
ness of the defendant's confession. 89
The court then questioned whether the defendant could make a knowing
waiver of his right against self-incrimination without being informed that
two attorneys who were representing him wished to speak with him.' 90 The
court had to determine the quantity of information required for an accused
to make an informed waiver.' 9' The plurality delineated a facts and circum-
stances test to determine if the defendant had made a knowing waiver of his
right against self-incrimination. 192 The test includes, but is not limited to,
184. The court noted the attorneys "did everything short of kicking in the interrogation
room door to gain access to [the defendant] ... 696 S.W.2d at 569.
185. Id. at 566.
186. Those jurisdictions that have found a third party may invoke a defendant's right to
counsel include Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685-86 (Del. 1983); State v. Matthews, 408 So.
2d 1274, 1278 (La. 1982); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560, 566-
67 (1969); People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 710-13, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19-22
(1979); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968);
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629-30, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842-45 (1963);
State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272, 277-78 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 471 Pa. 318, 370 A.2d 322, 324 (1977). Those jurisdictions that
have found a third person cannot invoke a defendant's right to counsel include Fuentes v.
Moran, 572 F. Supp. 1461, 1468-71 (D.R.I. 1983), ajfd, 733 F.2d 176 (Ist Cir. 1984); State v.
Smith, 294 N.C. 365, 241 S.E.2d 674, 679-81 (1978); Ohio v. Chase, 55 Ohio St. 2d 237, 378
N.E.2d 1064, 1069-70 (1978); State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 27-31 (R.I. 1982).
187. Dunn, 696 S.W.2d at 567.
188. Id. at 568.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 568 (citing State v, Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 29 (R.I. 1982).
192. 696 S.W.2d at 568.
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the relationship of the defendant to the attorney, the knowledge of the police
of the attorneys' presence, the conduct of the police, the nature of the law-
yers' request, and the background, experience, and conduct of the ac-
cused. 193 The court applied the test to the facts and concluded that the
persistent attempts by the attorneys to communicate with the defendant ne-
gated the defendant's waiver of his right against self-incrimination. 94 The
waiver was not a knowing waiver, regardless of its voluntariness. 19 5 The
court, in applying the test, primarily considered the nature of the lawyer's
request, which the circumstances of this case presented so strongly. 196
Currently under submission in the United States Supreme Court is a case
that involves facts similar to Dunn and presents precisely the same fifth
amendment questions raised and decided in Dunn. In Moran v. Burbine197
the Court is confronting the validity of a confession obtained under custodial
interrogation after an attorney, summoned by the defendant's sister, con-
tacted the police. The police deceived the attorney by stating that no inter-
rogation of the defendant would occur until the following day. Police never
told the defendant of the attorney's call, but interrogated the defendant any-
way. The interrogation resulted in a confession. The First Circuit held that
the actions of the police negated the defendant's waiver of fifth amendment
rights and thus rendered the defendant's statements inadmissible. 19 8
Whether the upcoming decision of the Supreme Court in Burbine will super-
sede the Dunn analysis is unclear. Because the factors leading to vitiation of
the waiver were more aggravating in Dunn than in Burbine, the Supreme
Court's resolution of Burbine may have little effect upon the Dunn analysis,
particularly since the Dunn court based its decision upon the construction of
Texas state constitutional law in addition to federal constitutional
standards. 199
193. Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). The court rejected a per se
test adopted in Delaware that requires police to notify a defendant whenever any attorney
wishes to consult with him in order for courts to consider the defendant's waiver effective. 696
S.W.2d at 568.
194. 696 S.W.2d at 569-70.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 569.
197. 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2319, 85 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1985).
198. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d at 187. The Rhode Island Supreme Court had held that
the trial court properly admitted the defendant's statements. State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 31
(R.I. 1982).
199. 696 S.W.2d at 570. The Dunn court grounded its holding on the right against self-
incrimination embodied in article I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution, as well as the fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Id.
If, however, the Supreme Court affirms the validity of the confession in Burbine by applying
a different analysis from that adopted by the court of criminal appeals in Dunn, the Texas
court may feel constrained to adhere to the Supreme Court's view, even as a matter of Texas
constitutional law. The Texas court recently announced that the state constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination should be construed as synonymous in meaning and application to
the federal fifth amendment privilege as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Ex parte
Shorthouse, 640 S.W.2d 924, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Should the Supreme Court admit
the Burbine confession, the court of criminal appeals may feel forced to either reverse itself on
the approach adopted in Dunn or overrule its holding in Shorthouse.
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IX. CONFESSIONS AS RESULTS OF COMPULSION AND FRUIT OF THE
POISONOUS TREE
In Oregon v. Elstad200 the Supreme Court held that an oral confession
obtained in violation of Miranda20 1 will not render a subsequent written con-
fession inadmissible either as the fruit of the illegal confession or as com-
pelled by the earlier confession. 20 2 Elstad arose from the burglary of a
home. A witness to the burglary contacted the police and implicated the
defendant, an eighteen-year-old neighbor and friend of the owners of the
burgled house. Two policemen went to the defendant's home with a warrant
for his arrest. The defendant's mother met the officers at the door and led
them to her son. One of the officers took the mother aside to inform her that
they had a warrant for her son's arrest. The other officer remained with the
defendant. The officer asked the defendant some general questions about
whether he knew of the burglary and told the defendant that the officers felt
he was involved. In response to the questions the defendant stated that he
was at the burglary. The defendant was not advised of his rights at the time
of the admission nor was he advised of his rights until his arrival at the
station. After police informed the defendant of his rights, he signed a writ-
ten confession.
At trial, the judge suppressed the oral statement because police obtained it
before advising the defendant of his rights.20 3 The court admitted the subse-
quent written confession because the defendant voluntarily made it after be-
ing advised of his rights. 20 4 An Oregon court of appeals reversed the decision
on the ground that the unwarned admission had a coercive impact on the
subsequent written confession and, therefore, the trial court should have
suppressed the written confession. 20 5
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court reversed the Ore-
gon court.20 6 The Supreme Court had to overcome two metaphorical hur-
dles in order to reach its decision. First, the Court had to find that the
written confession should not have been suppressed as the "fruit of a poison-
ous tree."' 20 7 Second, the Court had to find that the written confession was
voluntary and not the result of a coercive impact from the defendant's earlier
admission which let the "cat out of the bag" as to his guilt. 20 8
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine arose from Wong Sun v. United
States20 9 in which the Court used the metaphor in the fourth amendment
context to describe a remedy for evidence or witnesses discovered as a result
200. 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985).
201. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
202. 105 S. Ct. at 1296, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 235.
203. Id. at 1289-90, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 227.
204. Id. at 1290, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 227-28.
205. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. 673, 658 P.2d 552, 555 (1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1285,
1298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 238 (1985).
206. 105 S. Ct. at 1298, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 238.
207. See id. at 1290, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 228-29.
208. See id.
209. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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of an illegal arrest.2 10 The Court reasoned that the underlying policies of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule are indistinguishable as to direct or in-
direct fruits of an illegal search or seizure. 2 11  The policy justifications for
the exclusionary rule were, at that time, twofold: deterring police from us-
ing illegal methods to obtain evidence and preserving judicial integrity.21 2
In Miranda v. Arizona21 3 the Supreme Court held that the prosecution
could not use a statement of a defendant resulting from custodial interroga-
tion unless police had, prior to the statement, effectively advised the defend-
ant of his right against self-incrimination. 21 4 In Harris v. New York, 21 5
however, the Supreme Court held that statements taken in violation of the
Miranda rule are admissible for purposes of impeaching the defendant.2 1 6
The Court explained that Miranda only meant the prosecution could not use
the statements to make its case-in-chief and was not a bar for all purposes.2
17
In Michigan v. Tucker218 the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applied to a witness's testi-
mony obtained from custodial interrogation in violation of the Miranda
rule. 2 1 9 The Supreme Court noted that a violation of Miranda did not neces-
sarily constitute a violation of the fifth amendment. 220 The Court labeled
the Miranda requirement as merely a prophylactic device broader than the
fifth amendment itself.22' Accordingly, a violation of Miranda need not trig-
ger the exclusionary rule and its corollary fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine, which is the remedy for a constitutional violation. 222 The Court then
fashioned a new balancing test which weighed the need to make available all
relevant and trustworthy evidence and society's interest in effective prosecu-
tion of criminals against the need for deterring violations of the defendant's
rights. 223 The Court examined the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary
210. Id. at 487-88. As used in the fourth amendment context the exclusionary rule pro-
vides that courts should exclude from trial any evidence or witnesses obtained during an illegal
search or seizure. See id. at 484-86. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is a corollary to
the exclusionary rule providing that any evidence or witnesses discovered as a result of the
illegal search or seizure must also be excluded as the fruit of the illegal search. See id. at 484-
88. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to confessions obtained as a result of an
illegal search or seizure as well as to evidence and witnesses. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S.
687, 694 (1982); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02, 604-05 (1975).
211. 371 U.S. at 484-85.
212. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-59 (1961).
213. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
214. 384 U.S. at 444. The Miranda decision gave the prosecution a choice of either follow-
ing the procedures set out in Miranda or employing other equally effective means. Id. The
Miranda rule requires police to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent, of the fact that
any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him, and of his right to appointed
counsel in the event he cannot afford to retain an attorney. Id.
215. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
216. Id. at 225-26.
217. Id. at 224. The Court stated that the shield established by Miranda could not be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of defense. Id.
218. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
219. See id. at 438-39.
220. Id. at 444-45.
221. Id. 445-46.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 450-51.
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rule and found that the rationale was not necessarily applicable to a Miranda
violation.224 The Court disposed of the judicial integrity rationale as unnec-
essary because of its assimilation in the more specific rationales weighed. 22 5
The Court concluded that the remedy for a violation of Miranda need only
lead to the exclusion of the statement itself and not to the exclusion of subse-
quent evidence discovered as a result of the violation. 226
After Tucker's characterization of Miranda as merely procedural protec-
tion the Court in Elstad, without difficulty, took the next logical step and
concluded that a statement made in violation of the Miranda rule need not
lead to the exclusion of a later confession made after the appropriate Mi-
randa warnings.227 The majority focused on the voluntariness of a confes-
sion as the primary criterion of its constitutional acceptability under the fifth
amendment. 228 Therefore, unlike a fourth amendment violation that taints
the confession, a finding of voluntariness satisfies fifth amendment require-
ments in determining whether the confession is admissible into evidence. 229
The Court stated that a failure to administer the warnings created a pre-
sumption that the statement was involuntary. 230 This presumption is ir-
rebuttable for the use of the statement in the prosecution's case-in-chief, but
for impeachment use or for the use of the fruits of the unwarned confession
the presumption could be overcome if the unwarned statement was obtained
in a non-coercive manner. 23' The gravamen of the Court's reasoning is that
a Miranda violation only rises to a constitutional violation when the un-
warned statement is coerced. 232 If a statement was obtained in a non-coer-
cive manner but in violation of the Miranda rule, the statement will not lead
to the suppression of a subsequent informed and voluntary confession. 233
In addition to determining that the written confession was not excludable
as the fruit of the illegal confession, the Court also addressed the question of
whether the written confession could indeed be voluntary after the defendant
had already confessed his guilt in the oral admission. First, the Court di-
vided statements taken in violation of the Miranda rule into two categories:
those statements made involuntarily in response to official coercion, and
those statements that are clearly voluntary but made before the police advise
a defendant of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 234 If a
224. See id. at 446-48. The Court found that the deterrence rationale lost much of its force
when the official action was taken in good faith. Id. at 447.
225. Id. at 450 n.25.
226. Id. at 451-52.
227. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1293-94, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 232.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1292, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 230.
230. Id., 84 L. Ed. 2d at 231.
231. Id. at 1292-93, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 231-32.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 1293-94, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 232. The Court noted that Miranda warnings are
required only when officials take a suspect into custody. Id. at 1293, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 232.
Difficulty in defining "custody" would result in errors by law enforcement officers in determin-
ing when to administer the warnings. Id. Such Miranda errors should not result in the same
irremediable consequences as a fifth amendment violation. Id.
234. See 105 S. Ct. at 1294, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 232-33. The dissents in Elstad strongly dis-
agreed with the majority that any such distinction between unwarned confessions should exist.
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statement is actually coerced, the Court will look at the passage of time,
change in the identity of the interrogators, and change in the place of the
interrogation to determine whether a subsequent confession is voluntary. 235
If no coercion was involved in obtaining the initial unwarned admission,
then the Court concluded that it would not presume compulsion for any
subsequent confession made after proper Miranda warnings. 236
To reach its holding the Court rejected the Oregon court's position that
the unwarned confession would have a coercive impact on the defendant's
later confession because the defendant had let the cat out of the bag and
sealed his own fate.237 The Supreme Court noted that it had never recog-
nized that "the psychological impact of voluntary disclosure of a guilty se-
cret qualifies as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a
subsequent informed waiver.12 38 The Court then weighed the high cost to
law enforcement of losing the voluntary confession against the small amount
of protection added to the individual's interest in not being compelled to
incriminate himself and found little justification for the exclusion of the writ-
ten confession. 239 Finally, the Court stated that any connection between the
psychological disadvantage caused by a defendant's admission and his later
decision to cooperate with police is speculative and attenuated.240
The Court also rejected the argument that the defendant needed an addi-
tional warning to inform him that the prosecution could not use the earlier
statement against him before the defendant could make a fully informed
waiver of his rights.24' The Court reasoned that a breach in the Miranda
procedures may not come to light until well after police have given subse-
quent Miranda warnings and the defendant has given another statement. 24 2
Police could not be expected to identify when these breaches occur in order
to administer additional warnings because of the intricacy of the Miranda
rules themselves. 243 In addition, the Court stated that voluntariness does
not require a defendant to have a full appreciation of all of the consequences
flowing from his decision to give a statement. 244 Accordingly, the Court held
that no need existed for any additional warnings to the defendant in order
Id. at 1300-01, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 240-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 1324, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 270
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 1294, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 232-33 (citing Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710-12
(1967); Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 494-97 (1966) (decided together with
Miranda)).
236. Id. at 1296, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 235.
237. Id. at 1294-96, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 232-35.
238. Id. at 1295, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 234.
239. Id. at 1295, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 234.
240. Id. at 1295-96, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 234-35.
241. Id. at 1297, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 236-37.
242. Id., 84 L. Ed. 2d at 236.
243. Id., 84 L. Ed. 2d at 236-37. The Court noted "[p]olice officers are ill equipped to
pinch-hit for counsel, construing the murky and difficult questions of when 'custody' begins or
whether a given unwarned statement will ultimately be held admissible." Id., 84 L. Ed. 2d at
237.
244. Id. at 1297-98, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 237; see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769
(1970) (defendant's ignorance that prior coerced confession was inadmissible as evidence did
not compromise voluntariness of his guilty plea).
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that his subsequent confession be presumed voluntary.2 4 5
In summary, the Supreme Court has maintained a diluted Miranda exclu-
sionary rule that excludes any fruits obtained from an unwarned admission,
when that admission is obtained through actual coercion.246 When the de-
fendant makes an unwarned admission voluntarily, however, the Miranda
rule only leads to the exclusion of the unwarned statement itself.2 4 7 Any
evidence, witnesses, or subsequent admissions are not excluded because of
the unwarned statement.
X. POST-ARREST SILENCE
In Samuel v. State24 8 the court of criminal appeals gave a strong indica-
tion that it would not follow the holding of the United States Supreme Court
in Fletcher v. Weir.249 The decision in Fletcher permits a prosecutor, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, to impeach a defendant with the defend-
ant's silence after his arrest but before receiving warnings pursuant to Mi-
randa v. Arizona.25 0  Although the portion of the opinion in Samuel is
technically dicta, it significantly provides an adequate basis for asserting that
Texas law is more protective of a defendant's right to remain silent than is
federal law under Fletcher v. Weir.
In Samuel the appellant attempted to cash a check at a liquor store. The
store owner called the issuer of the check who informed him the check was
stolen. The defendant then attempted to retrieve the check and, failing to do
so, fled from the store. The store owner, armed with a shotgun, pursued the
defendant. The store owner cornered the defendant and held him until po-
lice arrived twenty minutes later.25' At trial the prosecution argued to the
jury that the defendant's twenty-minute silence during his arrest by the store
owner proved his guilt and his intent to commit the crime because an inno-
cent person would have professed his innocence at the time.252
245. 105 S. Ct. at 1297-98, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 237-38.
246. Note, however, the public safety exception created in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct.
2626, 2632-33, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 557-58 (1984) (in situations posing threat to public safety,
Miranda warnings not required before questioning), and the impeachment use exception cre-
ated in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971) (statements admissible for impeach-
ment purposes though obtained in violation of Miranda), which make no distinction between
coerced and uncoerced admissions. These exceptions may apply even when actual coercion
has occurred.
247. The statement is admissible under the public safety exception and for purposes of
impeachment.
248. 688 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
249. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
250. Id. at 607.
251. 688 S.W.2d at 494. The court of criminal appeals did not consider the validity of the
court of appeals' holding that the detention of Samuel by a private citizen constituted an arrest
under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.22 (Vernon 1977) (person is arrested when
placed in restraint or custody by officer or person with or without a warrant). Id. at 495 n.2.
See generally Hardinge v. State, 500 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (arrest occurs
when person's liberty of movement restrained); Hill v. State, 643 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.]) (discussing citizen's arrest), afl'd, 641 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982).
252. 688 S.W.2d at 494.
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The issue on appeal concerned the sufficiency of the appellant's objection
to preserve the error of admitting evidence of appellant's post-arrest si-
lence. 253 In holding that the objection was sufficient the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals elaborated at length on the bar to the use of a defendant's
post-arrest silence, silence occurring even before the defendant receives any
warning of his right to remain silent. 254 This state law rule conflicts with the
reasoning set out by the Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Weir, that use of a
defendant's post-arrest, pre-warnings silence for impeachment is not unfair
because, in the absence of warnings, the defendant was not induced by the
state to remain silent only to confront later the state's use of this silence
against him. 25
5
The court in Samuel found that the Supreme Court's holding in Fletcher
v. Weir made no sense. 256 The court indicated that it would continue to
adhere to its prior precedents prohibiting the use of all post-arrest silence
against a defendant for any purpose. 257 While not a direct holding on the
use of post-arrest, pre-warnings silence, Samuel provides support for the be-
lief that the rule in Fletcher v. Weir is not likely to become the law of Texas.
XI. DWI BREATH TESTS AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL
In 1983 the Texas legislature amended the DWI statute to provide that a
defendant's refusal to submit to an intoxilyzer test is admissible into evi-
dence at a subsequent trial. 258 The legislature also redefined intoxication by
providing that a 10% level of intoxication in the blood does not merely give
rise to a presumption of intoxication, but in itself constitutes intoxication. 25 9
The legislature left intact the statutory provisions requiring the suspension of
the defendant's driver's license upon a refusal to submit to such testing. 260
In Forte v. State26 1 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the issue
253. Id. at 495.
254. Id. at 496 n.7. As the court states, this bar to use of post-arrest silence arose from the
interpretation of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1979) (outlining require-
ments for admissibility of statements by an accused) and its predecessors.
255. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607. By using this reasoning the Supreme Court was able to
distinguish Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) wherein the Court had held that the use of
post-arrest, post-warnings silence of defendant for impeachment purposes violated the defend-
ant's due process rights. 455 U.S. at 607.
256. 688 S.W.2d at 496 n.7.
257. Id. Although Fletcher v. Weir involved the use of silence to impeach a testifying de-
fendant, whereas in Samuel the defendant did not testify, the court of criminal appeals cited
Taylor v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 340, 342, 42 S.W.2d 426, 427 (1931) and Harrison v. State, 491
S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) with approval. 688 S.W.2d at 496 n.7. In both
Taylor and Harrison, the prosecutor impeached the defendant's testimony with the defendant's
post-arrest silence. The prosecutor's actions resulted in reversal of the convictions. Taylor,
118 Tex. Crim. at 342, 42 S.W.2d at 427; Harrison, 491 S.W.2d at 922.
258. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 3(g) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
259. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701l-1(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986). These amend-
ments became effective on January 1, 1984. Act of June 16, 1983, ch. 303, § 29, 1983 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1568, 1607.
260. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2(d)-(f) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
261. 686 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. granted).
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of whether a DWI arrestee has the right to counsel before complying with a
demand to take an intoxilyzer test despite the implied consent provisions of
the statute.262 One prior court of appeals decision found no right to counsel
in this context under the statute as it existed prior to the 1983 amend-
ments. 263 The Fort Worth court held, however, that persons arrested for
driving while intoxicated do have a limited sixth amendment right to counsel
prior to deciding whether or not to submit a breath specimen. 264
The Forte court recognized that the resolution of the question turned on
whether the test constituted a critical stage of the adversarial process.26 5
Generally, under the sixth amendment an accused is guaranteed counsel at
any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out of court,
when the absence of counsel might prejudice the accused's right to a fair
trial.266 The court noted that a DWI arrestee faces a dilemma. 267 The ar-
restee is told that he may remain silent and contact a lawyer, but at the same
time he must answer a question that has significant results. 268 In the event
the arrestee refuses the test, he knows that his license will be suspended and
his refusal to take the test can be used as evidence against him at trial. 269 On
the other hand, if the arrestee consents and the test reveals an alcohol con-
tent in his blood of 0.10% or more, he has just provided the prosecution
with conclusive evidence of his guilt.270 The court concluded that to say
that this decision is not a critical stage of the prosecution stretches reason 27'
262. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (person who oper-
ates vehicle on public roads deemed to have given consent to breath or blood test).
263. Growe v. State, 675 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.).
The court in Growe noted, however, that under the version of the statute in effect at the time of
the trial, refusal to take an intoxilyzer test was not admissible into evidence, and expressly
stated that the court was not ruling in regard to the effect of the new law. Id. at 567-68.
264. Forte, 686 S.W.2d at 754. The Supreme Court has effectively extinguished the notion
that a fifth amendment right to counsel might attach for an arrestee confronted with this
problem. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court admitted into evidence
the results of blood alcohol-content tests derived from blood samples drawn from a defendant
without consent because the Court did not deem such samples "testimonial" communications
within the protection of the fifth amendment. Id. at 364-65. The Court went even further in
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), in which it held that admission of evidence of a
defendant's refusal to provide a breath sample did not violate the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 564.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly adopted the Schmerber position, see
Rodriguez v. State, 631 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), but has not yet addressed the
refusal issue decided by the Supreme Court in Neville. That the court of criminal appeals
would disagree with the Neville rationale is, however, highly unlikely since the court has
clearly evidenced its intention to define the scope of the Texas constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination as identical to that of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution. See
Exparte Shorthouse, 640 S.W.2d 924, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d
756, 762, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (opinion on motion for rehearing).
265. Forte, 686 S.W.2d at 753.
266. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
267. 686 S.W.2d at 753-54.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 754.
270. Id.
271. Id. To say that forcing an arrestee to make a decision concerning whether to take an
intoxilyzer test is not a critical pretrial proceeding may indeed "stretch" reason, but recent
United States Supreme Court opinions concerning the attachment of sixth amendment right to
counsel strongly indicate just that. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972). The
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and, therefore, determined that a person has a right to counsel prior to mak-
ing his decision. 27
2
Nevertheless, because of the exigency created by the bodily processes that
eliminate alcohol from the blood the court felt constrained to impose a time
limitation upon a defendant's exercise of the right to counsel. 2 73 Obviously,
if the courts permitted an accused to unduly delay his answer to the request,
the breath test would become meaningless. 274 The court thus fashioned a
qualification to the right to counsel in this context. An arrestee has the right
to consult with an attorney before making a decision whether to take a
blood-alcohol test, as long as the consultation does not unreasonably delay
the administration of the test.275 The police must inform the arrestee of this
right, and the officers must assist in vindicating the right. 276 In this regard
the court opined that police could comply with this standard by giving the
arrestee access to a telephone before testing and allowing the arrestee reason-
able time to contact his lawyer. 27 7 Finally, if an arrestee cannot contact his
attorney within a reasonable time, police may require the arrestee to make a
decision regarding testing in the absence of counsel. 27 8
Two months after Forte the Houston Court of Appeals decided the same
Court has made clear that the right to counsel does not attach prior to the filing of a formal
accusation or a preliminary hearing. Id. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977) (right
to counsel attaches when witness identification of accused takes place at preliminary hearing).
272. 686 S.W.2d at 754.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. The court in Forte adopted its holding from Prideaux v. State, 310 Minn. 405, 247
N.W.2d 385, 394 (1976).
276. 686 S.W.2d at 754.
277. Id. at 754.
278. Id. Other state jurisdictions are split on this issue. The following courts have found,
on various bases, a right to consult with an attorney: City of St. Louis Park v. Bunkers, 310
Minn. 431, 432, 247 N.W.2d 404, 404 (1976) (after arrest police must accommodate timely
request to telephone lawyer; based on statutory right to counsel); People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d
224, 227-29, 239 N.E.2d 351, 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418-19 (1968) (no arrest but denial of
defendant's request to telephone particular attorney improper); People v. Rinaldi, 107 Misc. 2d
916, 917-18, 436 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (Town Ct. 1981) (constitutional right to consult with
attorney if no significant or obstructive delay); People v. Sweeney, 55 Misc. 2d 793, 795-96,
286 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508-09 (Dist. Ct. 1968) (right to consult counsel before intoxication test;
distinguishing Schmerber on basis that New York law, unlike California law, permits right not
to consent to test); State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 551, 178 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1971) (state statute
provides for communication with counsel and friends immediately upon arrest, detention, or
deprivation of liberty); City of Dayton v. Nugent, 25 Ohio Misc. 31, 36, 265 N.E.2d 826, 830
(1970) (after arrest and Miranda warnings, defendant improperly denied opportunity to call
attorney until after tcst though pursuant to police department policy; statute guarantees arres-
tee speedy access to facilities to contact attorney); State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 321-22, 376
A.2d 351, 355 (1977) (because of driver's right to refuse test, chemical test rises to critical stage
in proceedings; limited right of counsel attaches); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 448,
610 P.2d 893, 900-01, vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 977 (1980) (right to counsel attaches
because driver must make decision to take or refuse test).
Courts finding no right to consult with counsel include Holmberg v. 54-A Judicial Dist.
Judge, 60 Mich. App. 757, 760, 231 N.W.2d 543, 544 (1975) (arrested driver's test is not
critical stage; no right to counsel); Flynt v. State, 507 P.2d 586, 588 (Okla. Cr. App. 1973)
(after arrest and Miranda warnings no right to counsel in choosing whether to take test); State
v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393, 404 (1981) (not every evidence-gathering procedure is
critical stage of proceeding; defendant not formally charged at time of test; therefore, no right
to counsel attached); Law v. City of Danville, 212 Va. 702, 703, 187 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1972)
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issue, but arrived at the opposite conclusion. In McCambridge v. State279
the court observed that the United States Supreme Court has held that the
right to counsel under the sixth amendment attaches only when the govern-
ment initiates judicial proceedings against an accused and the government
has committed itself to prosecute. 2 80 The Supreme Court has, indeed, held
that preparatory steps in the gathering of evidence by the state, such as fin-
gerprinting or taking a blood sample, are not critical stages in the prosecu-
tion of the accused. 28 1 Because the Houston court thereby found that the
DWI arrestee's dilemma did not occur in a critical stage of the prosecution,
the court expressly rejected the reasoning of the Fort Worth court in Forte
and concluded that an accused is not entitled to consult with an attorney
before deciding whether to refuse to take the breath test.282 The same court
of appeals adhered to its McCambridge holding in the subsequent case of
DeMangin v. State,2 83 reiterating that the breath test is not a testimonial
communication but instead is a preparatory step in the state's gathering of
evidence and is not constitutionally protected. 28 4
(minimal risk that breath test procedure would derogate from right to fair trial; no right to
counsel).
279. 698 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet, granted).
280. Id. at 394 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
281. Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967)).
282. Id.; see also Yates v. State, 679 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, pet. refd)
(no right to counsel on decision whether to take breath test).
283. 700 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no pet.).
284. Id. at 331-32. The court emphasized that a person arrested for driving while intoxi-
cated is deemed to have consented to the taking of breath or blood specimen to determine
blood-alcohol level by virtue of the implied consent provisions in TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 67011-5, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Id. at 332.
19861

